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Abstract
I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has
strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique
equilibrium have complementarities if and only if Cournot best-response dynamics has
no cycles; and that all games with multiple equilibria have complementarities.
As applications of my results, I show: 1. That generic 2X2 games either have no
pure-strategy equilibria, or have complementarities. 2. That generic two-player finite
ordinal potential games have complementarities.
JEL classification numbers: C62, C72
A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities
Federico Echenique∗
1 Introduction
A game has strategic complementarities (Topkis 1979, Vives 1990) if, given an order on
players’ strategies, an increase in one player’s strategy makes the other players want to
increase their strategies. For example, the players could be firms in price competition; if
each firm’s optimal price is an increasing function of the prices set by their opponents, the
game has strategic complementarities. In games of strategic complementarities (GSC),
Nash equilibria have a certain order structure; in particular, there is a smallest and
largest equilibrium (Topkis, Vives, Zhou (1994)). Further, the set of all rationalizable
strategies, and the set of limits of adaptive learning, is bounded below by the smallest
equilibrium and above by the largest equilibrium (Vives 1990, Milgrom and Roberts 1990,
Milgrom and Shannon 1994). GSC are a well-behaved class of games, and a useful tool
for economists.
Consider the coordination game in Figure 1, is it a GSC? That is, is there an order on
players’ strategies so that best-responses are monotone increasing? Yes, let α be smaller
than β. Then, player 2’s best response to α is α and to β is β. So, when 1 increases her
strategy from α to β, 2’s best response increases from α to β. Similarly for 1. So, with
this order the coordination game is a GSC.
The question I address is: what does this depend on? That is, when can we find an
order on strategies so that a game is a GSC? Note that how strategies are ordered is not
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α β
α 2, 2 0, 0
β 0, 0 1, 1
Figure 1: A coordination game.
part of the description of a game—it does not affect the available strategies or payoffs.
We as analysts use the order as a tool, therefore we are justified in choosing the order to
conform to our theory. Often, results on GSC are used by coming up with a clever order
on strategies that makes a situation into a GSC, this paper is concerned with how often
such orders exists.
We normally introduce strategic complementarities by assuming supermodular pay-
offs. The crucial feature for most results on GSC is that the game’s best-response corresp-
ondence is monotone increasing, and the assumption of supermodular payoffs is sufficient
for monotone increasing best-responses. 1 I shall argue that it is enough, for the purpose
of this paper, to define a GSC as a game for which there is a partial order on strategies
so that best-responses are monotone increasing (and such that strategies have a lattice
structure).
My results are:
1. With some qualifications, a game with a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is
a GSC if and only if Cournot best-response dynamics has no cycles except for the
equilibrium.
2. A game with two or more pure-strategy Nash equilibria is always a GSC.
I illustrate my results with two applications: Generically, 2X2 games are either GSC
or have no pure-strategy equilibria. And, generically, a finite two-player ordinal potential
game is a GSC, but ordinal potential games with more than two players need not be GSC.
I now discuss my results.
1. With some qualifications, in games with a unique Nash equilibrium, strategic
complementarities is equivalent to the absence of cycles in Cournot best-response dynam-
ics. If b is the game’s best-response function (the product of the players’ best-response
1In fact, the first paper using lattice-programming techniques in economics, Vives (1985), defined
GSC like I do here.
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functions) then Cournot best-response dynamics starting at x is defined by x0 = x,
xn = b(xn−1), n = 1, 2, . . .. Absence of cycles means that, if x is not an equilibrium,
Cournot best-response dynamics starting at x never returns to x, i.e. xn 6= x for all
n ≥ 1, or, equivalently, that x 6= bn(x) for all n ≥ 1. In finite games, absence of cycles is
equivalent to global stability, that is that bn(x) converges to the equilibrium for all x. In
infinite games, absence of cycles is a weaker condition than global stability—so I show
that a game with a unique, globally stable, equilibrium is a GSC.
2. A game with two or more pure-strategy equilibria is a GSC, so the vast majority
of games that we encounter in applied work are GSC. The order in the coordination
game of Figure 1 that makes its best-response function increasing involves making one
Nash equilibrium the smallest point in the joint strategy space, and the other equilib-
rium the largest point in the strategy space. I show that, if a game has at least two
equilibria, the same trick always works; we can order the strategies such that one equi-
librium is the largest strategy profile and the other equilibrium is the smallest, and such
that best-responses are monotone increasing. This result has implications for the use of
complementarities to obtain predictions in games.
The literature on GSC has developed a set-valued prediction concept: the set of
strategies that are larger than the smallest Nash equilibrium and smaller than the largest
Nash equilibrium. This “interval prediction” contains all rationalizable strategies, and
all strategies that are limits of adaptive learning. Is the interval prediction in general a
sharp prediction? Milgrom and Roberts suggest that the answer may be negative:
Indeed, for some games, these bounds are so wide that our result is of little
help: it is even possible that these bounds are so wide that the minimum
and maximum elements of the strategy space are equilibria. (Milgrom and
Roberts 1990, p. 1258)
Milgrom and Roberts go on to argue that, in some models, “the bounds are quite narrow.”
They present as examples an arms-race game, and a class of Bertrand oligopoly models,
where there is a unique equilibrium.
My results imply that this is generally the case: if a game does not have a unique
equilibrium, the interval prediction is essentially vacuous, as all games with multiple
equilibria are GSC where the smallest and largest equilibria are the smallest and largest
strategy profiles. This happens because games with multiple equilibria always involve a
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kind of coordination problem—namely the problem of coordinating on one equilibrium—
and this coordination problem can be formalized through an order on strategies that
makes the game a GSC.
I show that, in some games, no order that makes the game a GSC avoids a trivial
interval prediction. In fact, the coordination game in Figure 1 is such a game. On
the other hand, in the coordination game, all strategy profiles are rationalizable, which
may suggest that the interval prediction coincides in general with rationalizability. I
present an example where no order that makes the game a GSC, avoids strictly dominated
strategies in the interval prediction—this is further evidence that the interval prediction
is problematic.
I wish to emphasize that GSC are still a very useful tool. In a given game, comple-
mentarities jointly with the rest of the structure of the game can provide sharp results. 2
In a sense, complementarities is like compactness—most spaces we work with can be
compactified, but compactness is still a very powerful tool. For example, Topkis’s (1979)
algorithm for finding the smallest and largest Nash equilibria in GSC is very useful on a
given game with complementarities; and once Topkis’s algorithm has delivered an inter-
val prediction we can judge if it is sharp or not in that particular game. Other examples
are Amir’s (1996) elegant methods for analyzing Cournot oligopoly models using com-
plementarities, and the equilibrium uniqueness results in the literature on global games
(Morris and Shin 2000). 3
My results are a contribution to the theory of GSC, delineating the boundaries of the
set of GSC, but I do not provide new positive results on GSC, and I do not increase the
scope of applicability of existing results on GSC. In fact, applying my results requires a
previous knowledge of the equilibrium set of a game that one seldom has in applications—
rather, one tries to use results on GSC to obtain that knowledge. The point of this paper
is that complementarities alone do not possess important predictive power, but that we
can use complementarities to understand properties of a particular game.
Lippman, Mamer, and McCardle (1987), Sobel (1988), Milgrom and Roberts (1990),
2Possibly, that is why “natural” orders—such as the usual order on Rn—give sharp results: there is
a relation between complementarities and the rest of the structure of the game.
3Amir’s analysis does not proceed by introducing a convenient order on strategy spaces like I do (see
also Amir and Lambson (2000)). My results—which, unlike Amir’s, require prior knowledge of some
equilibria of the game—imply that there are more Cournot oligopoly models that can be made into a
GSC than the ones identified by Amir. But the structure, in addition to complementarities, that Amir
uses in his paper enables him to obtain substantive results about Cournot oligopoly, and his results
cannot be generalized using my characterization.
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Milgrom and Shannon (1994), Milgrom and Roberts (1994), Echenique (2002), and
Echenique and Sabarwal (2000) present comparative statics results for a parameterized
GSC. They prove that, if a parameter is complementary to players’ choices, some se-
lections of equilibria are monotone increasing in the parameter. My results prompt the
question: can all systematic comparative statics conclusion be rationalized as coming
from a parameterized GSC? The answer, it turns out, is no: there are parameterized
models (with multiple equilibria) such that no order delivers the comparative statics as
an application of results for GSC. In a sense, comparative statics acts as an “identifying
restriction,” we do not have enough degrees of freedom in selecting the order on strategies
so as to make the game a GSC and, at the same time, preserve monotone comparative
statics.
In Section 2 I give some preliminary definitions and present the model that the results
apply to. Section 3 presents my results for games with a unique equilibrium, and section 4
presents my results for games with multiple equilibria. Section 5 discusses the interval
prediction. Section 6 discusses comparative statics restrictions. In section 7 I present an
application to 2X2 games, and in section 8 an application to potential games. Section 9
contains the proofs of Theorems 3 and 7.
2 Definitions
2.1 Preliminaries
A detailed discussion of the concepts defined in this subsection can be found in Topkis
(1998). A pair (X,≤), where X is a set and ≤ is a transitive, reflexive, antisymmetric
binary relation, is a partially ordered set; (X,≤) is totally ordered if, for all x, y ∈ X,
x ≤ y or y ≤ x (≤ is then a total order on X); (X,≤) is a lattice if whenever x, y ∈ X,
both x∧y = inf {x, y} and x∨y = sup {x, y} exist in X. Note that a totally ordered set is
a lattice. A nonempty subset A of X is a sublattice if for all x, y ∈ A, x∧X y, x∨X y ∈ A,
where x∧X y and x∨X y are obtained taking the infimum and supremum as elements of
X (as opposed to using the relative order on A).
A lattice (X,≤) is complete if for every nonempty subset A of X, inf A, sup A
exist in X. A nonempty subset A of X is subcomplete if B ⊆ A, B 6= ∅ implies
infX B, supX B ∈ A, again taking inf and sup of B as a subset of X. For two subsets
A,B of X, say that A is smaller than B in the strong set order if a ∈ A, b ∈ B implies
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a ∧ b ∈ A, a ∨ b ∈ B.
Let (X,≤) be a lattice. Say that a correspondence φ : X  X is weakly increasing
over A ⊆ X if x, y ∈ A and x ≤ y implies that there is z ∈ φ(x) and z ′ ∈ φ(y) with z ≤ z′.
Also, say that φ is increasing in the strong set order if x < y implies that φ(x)
is smaller in the strong set order than φ(y). Note that when φ is a function, i.e. single
valued, both concepts coincide with the usual notion of “monotone weakly increasing.”
A correspondence φ : X  X takes finite values if φ(x) is a finite set for all x ∈ X.
2.2 The Model
All results in the paper are results about functions, or correspondences, on a set X.
The reader should think of the results as dealing with the best-response function, or
correspondence, of a game.
Let Γ =
{
I, {ui}i∈I {Si}i∈I
}
be a normal-form game. That is, I is a set of players,
and each player i ∈ I is endowed with a strategy space Si and a payoff function ui :
X = ×j∈ISj → R. If βi : X  Si is player i’s best-response correspondence, βi(s) =
argmaxs˜iui(s˜i, s−i), then φ : X  X defined by φ = ×i∈Iβi is the game’s best-response
correspondence. If best-responses are always unique, then βi is a function, and f = ×i∈Iβi
is the game’s best-response function. The set of fixed points of φ—or, if best-responses
are unique, of f—coincides with the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria of Γ.
I shall only deal with pure strategies and pure-strategy equilibria, but one can apply
my results to the best-response correspondence of the mixed extension of a game. The
interpretation of my results for the mixed extension of a game is straightforward. 4
A game Γ =
{
I, {ui}i∈I {Si}i∈I
}
is a game of strategic complementarities
(GSC) if there is an order ≤ on X such that (X,≤) is a lattice and φ is weakly in-
creasing. If Γ has unique best-responses, Γ is a GSC if there is an order ≤ on X such
that (X,≤) is a lattice and f is a monotone increasing function.
It will be useful to interpret some assumptions in terms of Cournot best-response
dynamics: If players meet to play Γ over and over again, and if they, in each round of
4I focus on pure strategies because the GSC literature considers usually orders on pure strategies. It
may be desirable to order both pure and mixed strategies in a way that is consistent (for example by
using the first-order stochastic dominance order on mixed strategies) but unless all strategy spaces are
chains, this is incompatible with strategic complementarities, see Echenique (2000).
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play n, choose a best response to their opponents’ play in n− 1, we say that they follow
Cournot best-response dynamics. If φ is Γ’s best-response correspondence, all Cournot
best-response dynamics are generated by xn ∈ φ(xn−1) (for some initial x0).
Definition 1 Let X be a set and φ : X  X be a correspondence. A point x ∈ X is
a cycle of φ if there is n ∈ N such that x ∈ φn(x). Let X be a topological space. A
fixed point e is globally stable for φ if, for every x ∈ X and every sequence {xk} with
x0 = x and xk ∈ φ(xk−1), xk → e. By interpreting f : X → X as a correspondence with
singleton values, these definitions extended to functions.
Absence of cycles means that no Cournot best-response dynamics will get caught in
a cycle. 5 And global stability means that players that engage in Cournot best-response
dynamics will eventually approach Nash equilibrium play.
3 Unique Equilibrium
Let X be a set, f : X → X a function and φ : X  X a correspondence. First, I
consider the problem of when there is an an order ≤ such that (X,≤) is a lattice and f
is monotone increasing. Second, I consider the problem of when there is an an order ≤
such that (X,≤) is a lattice and φ is weakly increasing. Third, I discuss some technical
issues.
Theorem 2 Let f : X → X have a unique fixed point e ∈ X. There is a total order ≤
on X such that f is monotone increasing if and only if f has no cycles besides e.
The proof of Theorem 2 follows from Theorem 3 below. Let me say here that: a) It is
immediate that the absence of cycles is necessary for the existence of a total order such
that f is increasing. For example, if x = f(f(x)) = f 2(x) and x 6= f(x) then f cannot be
monotone increasing, as one and only one of x < f(x) and f(x) < x must hold. Similarly
for x = fn(x), n ≥ 2. b) When X is finite it is easy to prove sufficiency, the idea is as
follows. Absence of cycles implies that for each x there is an n such that e = f n(x); now
let x < y whenever the smallest n such that e = fn(x) is larger than the smallest n such
that e = fn(y), this ensures that f(x) < f(y). It remains to order the elements that are
5Cournot best-response dynamics is a very naive learning model, my results do not depend of any
virtues of Cournot dynamics as a learning model. The absence of cycles should be viewed as a technical
condition. It is true, though, that Cournot dynamics is easy to implement on a computer, and therefore
the condition of absence of cycles is easy to verify computationally.
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α β γ
α 2, 2 0, 0 0, 0
β 0, 0 1,−1 −1, 1
γ 0, 0 −1, 1 1,−1
Γ1
α β
α 1,−1 2,−2
β 0, 0 1,−1
Γ2
Figure 2: A non-GSC, and a GSC that is zero-sum.
the same number of iterates away from e, which is slightly cumbersome but easy (see the
proof of Theorem 3 for the details, and for the proof when X is infinite).
Theorem 2 may have some mathematical interest, independently of the application
to game theory that I emphasize.
Absence of cycles is a non-topological condition that is weaker than global stability:
global stability implies the absence of cycles other than e, but absence of cycles does not
imply global stability—for example, let X be the unit disk in R2 and f be a rotation of
X by an irrational number, then f has a unique fixed point, (0, 0), and no cycles, but
(0, 0) is clearly not globally stable. The existence of an order such that f is increasing is
a non-topological statement, so it cannot depend on global stability.
3.1 Examples
Let Γ =
{
I, {ui}i∈I {Si}i∈I
}
be a normal-form game with a unique Nash equilibrium. If
all players have unique best-responses—which, as these are pure-strategy best-responses,
is generically the case when Γ is a finite game—then, by Theorem 2, Γ is a GSC if and
only if Cournot best-response dynamics have no cycles except for e. 6 In particular, if e is
globally stable under Cournot best-response dynamics, then Γ is a GSC. One implication
of these results is that a game that satisfies the dominant diagonal condition in Gabay
and Moulin (1980), and has thus a unique, globally stable, equilibrium, is a GSC.
As an illustration of Theorem 2, consider Γ1, the 3X3 game on the left in Figure 2.
This game has a unique pure-strategy equilibrium, and best-response dynamics have
the cycles (α, α) → (α, α), (β, α) → (α, γ) → (γ, α) → (α, β) → (β, α), and (β, β) →
(β, γ) → (γ, γ) → (γ, β) → (β, β). Therefore there is no order on strategies such that
the game in Figure 2 is a GSC.
6See section 3.3 for the difference between lattice and totally ordered strategy spaces.
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Consider Γ2, the zero-sum game on the right in Figure 2 as a second illustration of
Theorem 2. This is a GSC because it has a unique equilibrium and no cycles. The
intuitive idea that zero-sum games and GSC are different is therefore false.
3.2 Non-unique best-responses
Theorem 2 for functions can be generalized to correspondences with finite values, but
the characterization is not completely tight. Absence of cycles implies the existence of
a total order that makes the correspondence weakly monotone, but a weakly monotone
correspondence may have cycles, as weak monotonicity does not control all selections
from the correspondence.
Theorem 3 Let φ : X  X have a unique fixed point e ∈ X. If φ takes finite values
and has no cycles besides e, there is a total order on X such that φ is weakly increasing.
Further, if {e} = φ(e) and there is a total order on X such that φ is increasing in the
strong set order, then φ has no cycles besides e.
The proof of Theorem 3 is in section 9.
I need the hypothesis of a correspondence with finite values to use non-standard
analysis the way I do. If Γ is a game with unique best-responses, of course the best-
responses have finite values, and both weakly increasing and increasing in the strong set
order coincide with monotone increasing. So Theorem 3 implies Theorem 2. Also, if Γ
is a finite game, then best-responses take finite values. I have not been able to extend
the characterization in Theorem 3 to arbitrary games with infinite strategy spaces and
non-unique best-responses.
Global stability implies absence of cycles, thus we obtain
Corollary 4 Let X be a topological space and φ : X  X a correspondence with finite
values and a unique fixed point e ∈ X. If e is globally stable then there is a total order
on X such that φ is weakly increasing.
3.3 Totally ordered strategy space vs. a lattice strategy space,
and completeness.
Theorems 2 and 3 give necessary and sufficient conditions for a game to be a GSC with
a totally ordered strategy space. I defined GSC as games with lattice strategy spaces,
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y
z
.
.
.
x2
x3
x4
x1
Figure 3: Arrows show action of f : {e, x, y, z, x1, x2, . . .} → {e, x, y, z, x1, x2, . . .}
is there some loss in focusing on totally ordered strategies? Yes, but it is essentially a
technical problem: Consider Theorem 2. If a game’s best-response function does not
have cycles, then the game is a GSC because there is a total order on strategies such
that best responses are monotone increasing, and a totally ordered set is a lattice. On
the other hand, if Γ is a GSC where each Si is a complete lattice, and best-responses f
are continuous, then a unique Nash equilibrium is globally stable (Vives 1990, Milgrom
and Roberts 1990) so f has no cycles and there is a total order on strategies such that
f is increasing. In particular this implies that, in finite games, a game with a unique
equilibrium is a GSC if and only if best responses have no cycles.
In GSC where strategy spaces are non-complete lattices, best-responses may have
cycles. Consider the example in Figure 3. The arrows in the figure show the action
of a function f : {e, x, y, z, x1, x2, . . .} → {e, x, y, z, x1, x2, . . .}. Let the infinite set
{e, x, y, z, x1, x2, . . .} be ordered as a subset of R
2. The function f has a unique fixed
point, e, a cycle z → y → x → z, and it is monotone increasing. The example works
because Cournot best-response dynamics starting at x1 (or any other point larger than
x, y and z) is a monotone increasing sequence x1, x2, . . . that does not converge to a fixed
point different from e. So the characterization in Theorem 2 is not completely tight. As
I remarked earlier, complementarities is a non-topological condition, so the characteri-
zation must be independent of completeness of strategy spaces. In a sense, then, it is
impossible to avoid problems like the one in Figure 3.
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In the usual definition of GSC—supermodular games—there is a link between the
order and the topology on the strategy spaces that, among other things, ensures the
existence of equilibria (by Tarski’s Theorem), and that if equilibrium is unique it must
be globally stable. This link is (order) completeness. Here I construct orders that make
best-responses monotone increasing, but that do not have any relation to the topology on
the strategy spaces. In finite games this does not matter: a finite game without equilibria
cannot be a GSC, and a game with a unique equilibrium is a GSC if and only if this
equilibrium is globally stable. In infinite games, though, there may be GSC without
equilibria, and GSC with a unique equilibrium that is not globally stable. I wish to
emphasize that, despite this technical problem, for games with multiple equilibria, all of
Vives’s, Topkis’s and Milgrom and Roberts’s results hold trivially with the order that I
construct in section 4.
4 Multiple Equilibria
A game with two or more Nash equilibria is (almost trivially) a GSC: set one equilibrium
e as the smallest strategy profile, another equilibrium e as the largest, and let all other
strategy profiles x be unordered, except for satisfying e ≤ x ≤ e. I work out the details
in Theorem 5, but besides answering the question in this paper, such a coarse order is
uninteresting.
For finite games I can do much better; I can find an order such that the game is a
GSC, and such that the interval prediction is as sharp as is possible. Theorem 7 below
says that, if a function f on a finite set has at least two different fixed points, then there
is a lattice order such that f is monotone increasing, the interval prediction is the order
interval between the fixed points, and any other lattice order that does the same work
must have a larger interval prediction.
Theorem 5 Let φ : X  X have at least two different fixed points. There is an order ≤
on X such that (X,≤) is a complete lattice, φ is weakly increasing, and the set of fixed
points of φ is a complete sublattice of X.
Proof. Let e, e be different fixed points of φ. Define ≤ on X by x ≤ y if and only if
one of the following is true: x = y, x = e, or y = e. Then, for any non-singleton A ⊆ X,
e is the unique lower bound on A, hence inf A = e; similarly sup A = e as e is the unique
11
upper bound on A. Thus, for all x, y ∈ X, x∨y, x∧y ∈ X, and for all non-empty A ⊆ X,
inf A, sup A ∈ X, so X is a complete lattice.
Now, let x ≤ y and x 6= y; if x = e then e ∈ φ(x), so e ≤ z for all z ∈ φ(y), and
similarly if y = e. If x = y then any z = z ′ ∈ φ(x) = φ(y) satisfies z ≤ z′. Thus if x ≤ y
there is z ∈ φ(x) and z′ ∈ φ(y) with z ≤ z′, so φ is weakly increasing.
Finally, if A is a non-singleton set of fixed points, then e is the unique lower bound,
and e is the unique upper bound, on A. So, inf A = e and sup A = e. But e and e are
fixed points, so the set of fixed points is a complete sublattice of X. 
Remark.
1. The usual definitions of GSC ensure that best-responses are increasing in the strong
set order, and that φ takes subcomplete- sublattice-values. The order that I con-
struct in Theorem 5 does not guarantee that φ has these properties (unless, of
course, φ is a function), but Topkis’s, Vives’s, Milgrom and Roberts’s, and Mil-
grom and Shannon’s results are (trivially) true with the constructed order.
2. By Zhou’s version of Tarski’s Fixed Point Theorem the equilibrium set of a GSC
is a complete lattice. Topkis, Vives and Zhou present examples where it is not a
sublattice (see Echenique (2001), though). By Theorem 5 there is a partial order
on X such that this equilibrium set is a complete sublattice, without eliminating
complementarities.
For clarity, I include the statement of Theorem 5 when φ is a function as:
Corollary 6 Let f : X → X have at least two different fixed points. There is an order
≤ on X such that (X,≤) is a complete lattice, f is monotone increasing, and the set of
fixed points of f is a complete sublattice of X.
Theorem 7 Let f : X → X be a function on a finite set X with at least two different
fixed points, e and e. There is a partial order ≤ on X such that
1. (X,≤) is a complete lattice and f is monotone increasing;
2. e is the smallest, and e the largest, fixed point of f ;
3. if  is any other partial order on X that satisfies statements 1 and 2 of this theorem,
then, for any z ∈ X, e ≤ z ≤ e implies that e  z  e.
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Remark. Item 3 in the Theorem says that the order ≤ is—from the viewpoint of the
interval prediction—the best order possible: any other order that makes f a GSC must
involve a larger (less precise) interval prediction.
I leave the proof of Theorem 7 for Section 9. Let me say here that the proof is
constructive, so it works by finding a ≤ that satisfies the statements in the Theorem.
The order ≤ leaves out of the interval prediction (among other things) all elements x in
the basin of either e or e, where x is in the basin of a fixed point e if there is some n ∈ N
such that e = fn(x).
5 Discussion of the interval prediction.
I show that there are games for which the interval prediction is unavoidably vacuous, and
that there are games for which the interval prediction must contain strictly dominated
strategies.
The discussion of these games complements the message of Theorem 7. Theorem 7
delivers an order with the best possible interval prediction, but the construction of this
order is in general quite cumbersome. I believe the examples that follow will help under-
stand what can and cannot be left out of the interval prediction.
1. Consider the coordination game in Figure 1. I shall show that there is no order on
strategies that preserves complementarities, and where the interval prediction is sharper
than the whole strategy space. Let
b = b1 × b2 : {α, β}
2 → {α, β}2
be the game’s best-response function, and ≤ be an order on {α, β}2 such that b is mono-
tone increasing. Now, it must be that (α, β) and (β, α) are incomparable under ≤. To
see this, let (α, β) < (β, α). Then b(β, α) = (α, β) < b(α, β) = (β, α), so b would not be
increasing. Similarly if (β, α) < (α, β). Then, for ({α, β}2 ,≤) to be a lattice, it must
be that (α, β) ∨ (β, α) and (α, β) ∧ (β, α) equals either (α, α) and (β, β) or, respectively,
(β, β) and (α, α). But (α, β)∨ (β, α) 6= (α, β)∧ (β, α), hence either (α, α) is the smallest
strategy profile and (β, β) is the largest, or vice versa.
2. I show that this does not depend on the coordination game being 2X2, it depends
on the cycles in best-responses between the non-equilibrium strategy profiles (α, β) and
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α β γ δ
α 2, 2 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
β 0, 0 0, 1 1, 0 0, 0
γ 0, 0 1, 0 0, 1 0, 0
δ 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 1, 1
Figure 4: Γ3, a 4X4 coordination game.
(β, α). 7 In fact, consider the 4X4 coordination game Γ3 in Figure 4. In this game,
best-responses have three cyclical orbits (besides the fixed-point cycles (α, α) → (α, α)
and (δ, δ) → (δ, δ)):
(β, α) → (α, β) → (γ, α) → (α, γ) → (β, α),
(δ, γ) → (β, δ) → (δ, β) → (γ, δ) → (δ, γ),
and (β, β) → (γ, β) → (γ, γ) → (β, γ) → (β, β).
Then, if a partial order ≤ makes the 4X4 coordination game into a GSC, no strategy
that belongs to a cyclical orbit can be the smallest, or the largest, strategy profile of the
game. To see this, suppose, for example, that (β, α) is the smallest strategy profile. Then
(β, α) < (α, β), so if b is monotone increasing, b3(β, α) ≤ b3(α, β). But (β, α) = b3(α, β)
and (α, β) = b3(β, α). So it must be that the smallest and largest element in the strategy
space is (α, α) and (δ, δ), as a finite lattice has a smallest and a largest element.
3. All strategies in the coordination games are rationalizable. One could then con-
jecture that the interval prediction must coincide with the rationalizable strategies, and
that the problem with the coordination games is that all strategies are rationalizable.
The conjecture would be false, I present an example of a game where one of the player’s
dominated strategies must be in the interval prediction.
Consider Γ4, the example in Figure 5. Γ4 is a three-player game. The strategy space
of each player i is {α, β}; the game is represented in two matrices, player 1 chooses rows,
player 2 chooses columns, and player 3 chooses matrices. In each entry of a matrix, the
first number is the payoff to player 1, the second number is the payoff to player 2, and
the third number is the payoff to player 3.
Let b be Γ4’s best-response function, and X = {α, β}
3 be the strategy space. Note
that b has exactly two fixed points, (α, α, β) and (β, β, β). Note also that α is a strictly
7In both coordination games, all strategy profiles are rationalizable. So, it follows from Milgrom and
Roberts’s results that all strategy profiles are in the interval prediction. I show this directly here and in
item 1 to make explicit the role of cycles.
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α β
α 1, 0, 0 1, 1, 0
β 0, 0, 0 0, 1, 0
α
α β
α 1, 1, 1 0, 0, 1
β 0, 0, 1 1, 1, 1
β
Figure 5: Γ4, a three-player game.
dominated strategy for player 3. There is a cycle (α, β, β) → (β, α, β) → (α, β, β). And
b(s1, s2, α) = (α, β, β) for all s1, s2 ∈ {α, β}.
Let ≤ be an order that makes Γ4 into a GSC. Repeating the arguments used for the
coordination games, (α, β, β) and (β, α, β) must be unordered because they are cycles.
So, (α, β, β) and (β, α, β) cannot be either inf≤ X or sup≤ X. I claim that, for all s1, s2 ∈
{α, β}, (s1, s2, α) 6= inf≤ X and (s1, s2, α) 6= sup≤ X. Suppose that some (s1, s2, α) =
inf≤ X. Then (s1, s2, α) ≤ (α, β, β). But b is monotone increasing, thus
(α, β, β) = b(s1, s2, α) ≤ b(α, β, β) = (β, α, β),
impossible since (α, β, β) and (β, α, β) must be unordered. Similarly, (s1, s2, α) 6= sup≤ X,
for all s1, s2 ∈ {α, β}. Then (α, α, β) = inf≤ X and (β, β, β) = sup≤ X (or vice-versa).
Thus, any order that makes Γ4 into a GSC must give all X as the interval prediction.
Not only is the interval prediction vacuous, it does not rule out player 3 choosing α, a
dominated strategy.
6 Comparative Statics
In a parameterized GSC, if a parameter t is complementary to players’ choices, there
are selections of equilibria that are monotone increasing in t (Lippman, Mamer, and
McCardle 1987, Sobel 1988, Villas-Boas 1997, Milgrom and Roberts 1990, Milgrom and
Roberts 1994, Milgrom and Shannon 1994, Echenique 2002, Echenique and Sabarwal
2000). By theorems 3 and 5, most games can be rationalized as GSC. A natural question
is: can any comparative statics conclusion be rationalized as coming from a parameterized
GSC? The answer is no, comparative statics conclusions act as an “identifying condition”
that restricts the choice of an order on strategy spaces.
Using the framework in Milgrom and Roberts (1994), the question can be phrased as
follows. Let ft, ft′ : X → X, let e be a fixed point of ft, and e
′ a fixed point of ft′ . Is
there an order on X such that e < e′ and such that ft(x) ≤ ft′(x) for all x?
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α β
α a, b c, d
β e, f g, h
Γ4
α β
α 1, 1 0, 1
β 0, 1 1, 0
Γ5
Figure 6: Γ3 used in the proof of, and Γ4 illustrates, Proposition 8
In general the answer is no. Consider the following example, let x, e, e′ ∈ X with
e = ft(e), e
′ = ft′(e
′) and e 6= e′. Suppose that e′ = ft(x) and e = ft′(x). If there is an
order ≤ such that ft(z) ≤ ft′(z) for all z ∈ X, then e = ft(e) ≤ ft′(e) = e
′ and e < e′
because e 6= e′. But e′ = ft(x) ≤ ft′(x) = e, a contradiction.
The example above shows that we cannot rationalize comparative statics conclusions
by a model where the parameter is complementary to players’ choices. Alternatively, is
there an order on X such that e < e′ and such that ft and ft′ are monotone increas-
ing functions? That is, can we rationalize a comparative statics conclusion as coming
from parameterized GSC, even though the parameter may not be complementary to the
strategies? The following example shows that this need not be the case. Let x, e, e′ ∈ X
with e = ft(e), e
′ = ft′(e
′) and e 6= e′. Suppose that x = ft(e
′), e = ft′(x) and e
′ = ft′(e).
Then e < e′ implies that ft(e) ≤ ft(e
′), so e < x. Then ft′(e) ≤ ft′(x) implies that e
′ < e,
a contradiction.
7 Application 1: 2X2 Games
As an application of Theorems 3 and 5 I show that, generically, 2X2 games either have no
equilibria or have complementarities. Essentially, then, 2X2 games are either isomorphic
to “Matching Pennies”, or they are GSC.
Proposition 8 Generically, a 2X2 game either has no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium,
or it is a GSC.
Proof. Consider the game in Figure 6 on the left. Suppose that a, b, c, etc. are such
that (β, β) is the unique Nash equilibrium, and (β, β) is a strict equilibrium, so c < g
and f < h. I will rule out all possible cycles in best-response dynamics, except for the
cycle involving (β, β). Then Theorem 2 implies that the game is a GSC.
Since c < g and f < h, (α, α) is not a best response to (α, β) or to (β, α). This
rules out the cycles (α, α) → (α, β) → (α, α), (α, β) → (α, α) → (α, β), (α, α) →
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(β, α) → (α, α), (β, α) → (α, α) → (β, α), (α, α) → (β, α) → (α, β) → (α, α), and
(α, α) → (α, β) → (β, α) → (α, α).
Finally, the cycle (β, α) → (α, β) → (β, α) requires that a ≥ e and b ≥ d. But then
(α, α) would be an equilibrium, contradicting that (β, β) is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Similarly for (α, β) → (β, α) → (α, β). These are all possible cycles.
We have shown that all 2X2 games with a unique, strict Nash equilibrium are GSC.
All games with more than one equilibrium are GSC by Theorem 5. The property that a
unique equilibrium is strict is generic in the class of 2X2 games. 
Proposition 8 does not extend to more complex games than 2X2, see the example in
Figure 2 on the left. The “genericity” qualification in Proposition 8 is necessary. Consider
the game on the right in Figure 6. This game has a unique Nash equilibrium (α, α) in
pure strategies, and a cycle, (α, α) → (α, β) → (β, α) → (α, α). The cycle is produced
by player 2’s indifference when 1 chooses α, which is non-generic.
8 Application 2: Ordinal Potential Games
A game Γ =
{
I, {ui}i∈I {Si}i∈I
}
is an ordinal potential game if there is a function
P : S = ×i∈ISi → R such that
ui(si, s−i) < ui(s
′
i, s−i) if and only if P (si, s−i) < P (s
′
i, s−i),
for all si, s
′
i ∈ Si, s−i ∈ S−i, and i ∈ I. Potential games were studied in detail by
Monderer and Shapley (1996) (see their paper for references to earlier work on potential
games).
My results shed some light on the relation between GSC and ordinal potential games.
I show that, generically, a finite two-player ordinal potential game is a GSC; and that
ordinal potential games with more than two players need not be GSC. 8
Proposition 9 Let Γ be a finite two-player game with unique best responses. If Γ is an
ordinal potential game, then it is a GSC.
Proposition 9 does not extend to games with more than two players. For a counterex-
ample, consider the three-player game in Figure 7. Here, player 1 chooses a strategy in
8Further, it is easy to see that GSC need not be ordinal potential games. I do not discuss this here,
the counterexamples are very simple.
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α β
α −1,−1,−1 −1,−1,−1
β 1, 1, 0 0, 0, 1
γ 0, 0, 1 1, 1, 0
α
α β
α 1, 1, 1 1, 0, 1
β 0, 1, 1 0, 0, 0
γ 0, 0, 0 0, 1, 1
β
Figure 7: A three-player ordinal potential game that is not a GSC.
S1 = {α, β, γ} (rows), player 2 chooses a strategy in S2 = {α, β} (columns), and player
3 a strategy in S3 = {α, β} (matrices). The payoffs are indicated in the figure.
The game in Figure 7 has a unique equilibrium, (α, α, β), and the best-response cycle
(β, β, α) → (γ, α, α) → (β, β, α) By Theorem 2, then, there is no order on strategies
so that his game is a GSC. But by Monderer and Shapley’s results, the game has a
generalized ordinal potential, as it has the finite improvement property (this is a bit
cumbersome to check). Now just perturb the game a bit, it still will not be a GSC
because the best-response cycle will persist, and it will be an ordinal potential game by
Monderer and Shapley’s Corollary 2.6.
Proof of Proposition 9. To prove Proposition 9, I need two definitions and two
lemmas. Let Γ = {S1, S2, u1, u2} be a two-player game with unique best-responses, and
let β(s1, s2) = (β1(s2), β2(s1)) be Γ’s best-response function—note the minor change in
notation. A best-response cycle of Γ is a sequence (s0, s1, . . . sn) in S = S1 × S2, where
sk = β(sk−1), 1 ≤ k ≤ n, s0 = sn, and sk−1 6= sk, 1 ≤ k ≤ n. The use of the term “cycle”
here is inconsistent with the rest of the paper, but no confusion should arise because it
will be clear, at all times in this section, that a cycle is the whole path (s0, s1, . . . sn), not
a point in the range of the path.
An infinite improvement path in S is a sequence (w0, w1, . . .) such that:
• (w0, w1, . . .) is not eventually constant (i.e. there is no K such that the sequence
(wK , wK+1, . . .) is constant).
• wk−1 and wk differ in at most one component,
• if wk−1 and wk differ, and i is the player that changes strategy between wk−1 and
wk, then ui(w
k−1) < ui(w
k).
The definition of an infinite improvement path differs from the one in Monderer and
Shapley. However, it is immediate to modify their Lemma 2.3 to show:
18
Lemma 10 (Monderer and Shapley (1996)) An ordinal potential game cannot have an
infinite improvement path.
I do not include a proof of Lemma 10 in this paper.
Lemma 11 Let Γ be a two-player game with unique best responses and a unique Nash
equilibrium. If Γ has a best-response cycle, then it has an infinite improvement path.
Proof. Let (s0, s1, . . . sn) be a best-response cycle. We must have n ≥ 2, or (s0, s1, . . . sn)
is a constant sequence.
I claim that either s01 6= s
2
1, s
0
2 6= s
2
2, or both hold. Suppose, by way of contradiction,
that s01 = s
2
1 and s
0
2 = s
2
2. Then s
0
1 = β1(s
1
2) and s
0
2 = β2(s
1
1). Now s
1
1 = β1(s
0
2) and
s12 = β2(s
0
1) imply that (s
0
1, s
1
2) and (s
1
1, s
0
2) are Nash equilibria. But there is a unique
Nash equilibrium, so (s01, s
1
2) = (s
1
1, s
0
2); impossible, as (s
0
1, s
0
2) = s
0 6= s1 = (s11, s
1
2).
Suppose, without loss of generality, that s02 6= s
2
2.
Extend the sequence (s0, s1, . . . sn) to the infinite sequence
(s0, s1, . . . sn−1, s0, s1, . . .).
So, sn+11 refers to s
1
1, s
2n+3
2 to s
3
2, and so on. Construct the sequence
w = (w0, w1, w2, . . .) = ((s11, s
0
2), (s
1
1, s
2
2), (s
3
1, s
2
2), (s
3
1, s
4
2), (s
5
1, s
4
2), (s
5
1, s
6
2), . . .).
I shall show that w is an infinite improvement path.
If n is odd, we can construct the following finite sequences:
y0 = (s11, s
0
2) z
0 = (s01, s
1
2)
y1 = (s11, s
2
2) z
1 = (s21, s
1
2)
y2 = (s31, s
2
2) z
2 = (s21, s
3
2)
y3 = (s31, s
4
2) z
3 = (s41, s
3
2)
...
...
yn−1 = (sn1 , s
n−1
2 ) = (s
0
1, s
n−1
2 ) z
n−1 = (sn−11 , s
n
2 ) = (s
n−1
1 , s
0
2)
.
If n is even, we shall only need the y sequence as constructed, with the modification that
we get yn−1 = (sn−11 , s
n
2 ) = (s
n−1
1 , s
0
2).
It is easy, if somewhat cumbersome, to show that: If n is odd, then
w = (y0, y1, . . . yn−1, z0, z1, . . . zn−1, y0, y1, . . .).
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And that, if n is even, then
w = (y0, y1, . . . yn−1, y0, y1, . . .).
In both cases, w is not eventually constant, as y0 6= y1 because s
0
2 6= s
2
2.
Let wk−1 6= wk. If wk−1 = (sk1, s
k−1
2 ), and w
k = (sk1, s
k+1
2 ), then s
k−1
2 6= s
k+1
2 = β2(s
k
1).
Best-responses are unique, then u2(s
k
1, s
k−1
2 ) < u2(s
k
1, s
k+1
2 ). Similarly if w
k = (sk+11 , s
k
2),
and wk−1 = (sk−11 , s
k
2). So, w is an infinite improvement path. 
By Monderer and Shapley’s (1996) Corollary 2.2, Γ has at least one equilibrium. If it
has two or more equilibria, it is a GSC by Theorem 5. Let Γ have a unique equilibrium.
Lemma 10 implies that Γ cannot have an infinite improvement path, so Lemma 11 implies
that it cannot have a best-response cycle; by Theorem 2, then, Γ is a GSC. 
9 Proofs
9.1 Proof of Theorem 3
I prove the second statement in Step 1. Steps 2 and 3 prove the first statement when X
is finite—Step 2 constructs an order such that φ is weakly increasing, and Step 3 checks
that this is a total order. Steps 4 and 5 prove the first statement for arbitrary X by
non-standard analysis methods. The idea is to embed X in a hyperfinite set, apply the
result for finite sets to get an order that works in the hyperfinite set, and then restrict
the order to X.
Step 1. Let ≤ be a total order on X such that φ is increasing in the strong set order,
and let x 6= e. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there is {xm}
K
m=0 ⊆ X such that
x = x0 = xK and xm ∈ φ(xm−1), 1 ≤ m ≤ K − 1. Note that we must have xm 6= e for all
m because φ(e) = {e} would imply that x = e.
Since X is totally ordered by ≤, either x < xK−1 or xK−1 < x, as x = xK−1 is ruled
out because x is not a fixed point. Suppose that x < xK−1, I will show by induction that
xK < xK−1 < . . . < x0 = x, a contradiction. First, x < xK−1 implies that φ(x) 3 x1 is
smaller than φ(xK−1) 3 x in the strong set order, so x1∧x ∈ φ(x). Now, x1∧x ∈ {x1, x}
because ≤ is a total order, and x /∈ φ(x) because x is not a fixed point. So we must have
x1 < x. Now for the inductive step, I want to show that, if xm < xm−1, then xm+1 < xm
(1 ≤ m ≤ K−1). If xm < xm−1, then φ(xm) 3 xm+1 is smaller than φ(xm−1) 3 xm in the
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strong set order. Then {xm+1, xm} 3 xm+1 ∧ xm ∈ φ(xm), but xm /∈ φ(xm) as xm 6= e, so
xm+1 < xm.
If, instead, x > xK−1 we can apply an analogous argument to reach a contradiction.
So there cannot be a K with x ∈ φK(x).
Step 2. Let X be finite. Let φ : X  X be a correspondence with a unique fixed
point e ∈ X, and no cycles besides e. For all x ∈ X there is at least one sequence {xm}
K
m=0
with x0 = x, xm ∈ φ(xm−1), m = 1, 2, . . . K, and xK = e; that is a path connecting x and
e, K is the length of the path. To see that such a path must exist, note that, by absence
of cycles, if xm 6= e for m = 1, 2, . . . K, then {xm}
K
m=0 are all distinct, so X has at least
K + 1 elements. X is finite, so we must have, for K large enough, that xK = e. For each
x ∈ X, let Kx be the smallest K such that there is a path of length K connecting x and
e. Clearly, Ke = 0. Fix, for each x, a path of minimal length {xm}
Kx
m=0 connecting x and
e. Note that Kx1 = Kx − 1, as the K’s are minimal.
Define Xm = {x ∈ X : Kx = m}, m = 0, 1, . . . M , where M is such that X =
∪Mm=0Xm. The collection {Xm}
M
m=0 is a partition of X because it covers X and has
disjoint elements, as the Kxs are minimal.
I shall define recursively an order ≤m on Xm, m = 0, 1, . . . M . Let  be a total order
on X such that e is the largest element of X (for example, embed X in N such that e
is mapped to a number larger than any other element in X, and take the relative order
on X). Let ≤0 on X0, be the restriction of  to X0. Given a total order ≤m on Xm, let
≤m+1 on Xm+1 be defined by, x ≤m+1 y if x1 <m y1 or if x1 = y1 and x  y, where x1
and y1 are the first elements in the paths connecting x and y, respectively, to e. Note
that ≤m is in fact a total order because it is a lexicographic order.
Finally, define a total order ≤ on X by x ≤ y if either ky < kx or if ky = kx and
x ≤kx y. Note that e is the largest element in X.
Step 3. I shall check that φ is weakly increasing. Let x, y ∈ X and {xm}
Kx
m=0,
{ym}
Ky
m=0 be the paths of minimal length connecting x and y to e from step 2.
Let x ≤ y. If Ky < Kx then there is x1 ∈ φ(x) and y1 ∈ φ(y), x1 ∈ {xm}
Kx
m=0,
y1 ∈ {ym}
Ky
m=0, with Ky1 = Ky − 1 < Kx − 1 = Kx1 because the K’s are minimal. Then,
x1 ≤ y1. If Ky = Kx then there is x1 ∈ φ(x) and y1 ∈ φ(y), x1 ∈ {xm}
Kx
m=0, y1 ∈ {ym}
Ky
m=0
with x1 ≤Kx+1 y1. Then Ky1 = Ky − 1 = Kx − 1 = Kx1 , because the K’s are minimal.
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Then, x1 ≤ y1. In both cases there is x1 ∈ φ(x) and y1 ∈ φ(y) with x1 ≤ y1, thus proving
that φ is weakly increasing
To prove that ≤ is a total order, note first that x ≤ x because x is in some Xm, and
x ≤m x, as ≤m is an order; thus ≤ is reflexive. If x ≤ y and y ≤ x then we must have
Kx = Ky, and then x = y because ≤Kx is an order. So, ≤ is antisymmetric. Let x ≤ y
and y ≤ z. If Ky < Kx or Kz < Ky then Kz < Kx and x ≤ z. If Kx = Ky = Kz then
x ≤ z follows from transitivity of ≤Kx . Thus ≤ is transitive. Finally, ≤ is total because
if x, y ∈ X then there is m, n such that x ∈ Xm and y ∈ Xn. If m < n or n < m, x and
y are ordered. If n = m, x and y are ordered because ≤m is a total order.
Step 4. Suppose first that φ(e) = {e}. Let H be a hyperfinite set with X ⊆ H ⊆ ∗X.
For all x ∈ X, φ(x) is finite, then ∗φ takes hyperfinite values, and therefore ∗φ(H) is
hyperfinite, as it is the hyperfinite union of hyperfinite sets. Let H˜ = H ∪ ∗φ(H), H˜ is
hyperfinite.
By the Transfer Principle, h ∈ H implies (h ∈ ∗φ(h) ⇒ h = e). Define φ˜ : H˜ → H˜
by
φ˜(h) =
{
∗φ(h) if h ∈ H
{e} if h ∈ H˜\H.
φ˜ is internal, and φ˜(e) = ∗φ(e) = {e}. I show that e is the only fixed point of φ˜.
Suppose x ∈ φ˜(x). First, if x ∈ H, then φ˜(x) = ∗φ(x), so x ∈ ∗φ(x) implies that x = e
by Transfer. Second, if x ∈ H˜\H then φ˜(x) = {e}, so x = e ∈ H, a contradiction.
To show that φ˜ has no cycles except for e, suppose that x ∈ φ˜K(x) for some x ∈ H˜
and K ∈ ∗N. Note that x ∈ H because x ∈ H˜\H implies that φ˜m(x) = {e} for all
m, and e ∈ H. There is a sequence {xm}
K
m=0 with x0 = xK = x and xm ∈ φ˜(xm−1),
m = 1, 2, . . . K. If there is m such that xm ∈ H˜\H then e = xl, m ≤ l ≤ K, so x = e.
On the other hand, if xm−1 ∈ H for all m, then xm ∈ φ˜(xm−1) = ∗φ(xm−1) for all m.
Then x is a cycle of ∗φ, so x = e by Transfer.
Then, H˜ is hyperfinite, φ˜ : H˜  H˜ has a unique fixed point e, and no cycles but e.
By steps 2 and 3 above and the Transfer Principle, there is a total order  on H such
that x  e for all x ∈ H, and such that x  y implies that there is z ∈ φ˜(x) and z′ ∈ φ˜(y)
with z  z′. Let ≤ be the restriction of  to X ⊆ H˜, ≤ is a total order on X, and e is
its largest element.
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To verify that φ is weakly increasing, let x ≤ y. Then, x  y implies that there is
z ∈ φ˜(x) and z′ ∈ φ˜(y) with z  z′. But φ˜(x) = ∗φ(x) = φ(x) and φ˜(y) = ∗φ(y) = φ(y),
as x, y ∈ X ⊆ H. Then z ∈ φ(x), z′ ∈ φ(y), and z ≤ z′ because z  z′.
Step 5. Finally, let φ(e) 6= {e}, and let φ′ : X  X coincide with φ on X\ {e}, and
take the value {e} on e. By step 4 there is an order ≤ on X such that e is its largest
element and such that φ′ is weakly increasing. Now we check that φ is weakly increasing
in this order as well. We only need to prove that if x ∈ X then there is z ∈ φ(x) and
z′ ∈ φ(e) with z ≤ z′. But, since e ∈ φ(e) and e is the largest element in X, we can set
z′ = e and be done. 
9.2 Proof of Theorem 7
First I construct an order ≤ on X, then I show that ≤ satisfies the statements in the
theorem.
Denote by C the set of cycles of f , so
C = {x ∈ X : ∃n ∈ N s.t. fn(x) = x} .
Note that e, e ∈ C.
A path in X is a sequence pi = {x1, . . . xL} such that, xl /∈ C for 1 ≤ l ≤ L,
f(x1) ∈ C\ {e, e}, f−1(xL) = ∅, and xl = f(xl+1) for 1 ≤ l ≤ L− 1. Let Π be the set of
all paths. Note that Π is finite.
If pi = {x1, . . . xL} is a path, let Hpi = L denote the length of pi. For each xl ∈ pi, let
hpi(xl) = l. Let A = ∪{pi : pi ∈ Π}.
If e ∈ X is a fixed point of f , the basin of e, denoted Be, is the set of points z ∈ X
such that e = fn(z) for some n. For each z ∈ Be, let ge(z) = inf {n ∈ N : fn(z) = e}.
Define ge(e) = 0. Let He = sup {ge(z) : z ∈ Be}.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that He ≥ He (if He < He just relabel e and e).
For each z ∈ A, let
g(z) = inf {He − [Hpi − hpi(z)] : pi ∈ Π and z ∈ pi} .
I claim that X = C ∪ A ∪ Be ∪ Be : Let z ∈ X. Since X is finite, for large enough n,
either fn(z) is a fixed point or it is a cycle. If fn(z) is eventually e or e, then x ∈ (Be ∪ Be).
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If fn(z) is eventually some other x ∈ C, then either z ∈ C in the first place, or z ∈ A. In
any case, x ∈ C∪A∪Be ∪Be, which establishes the claim. Also note that, by definition
of C, A, Be and Be, A ∩ C = ∅, A ∩ Be = ∅, A ∩ Be = ∅, Be ∩ Be = ∅, Be ∩ C = {e} and
Be ∩ C = {e}.
Before I define ≤ I need two auxiliary orders. I shall define ≤e on Be and ≤e on Be
such that f restricted to either Be or Be is monotone increasing, and such that e is the
largest element of Be, and e is the smallest element of Be. First, I claim that f(Be) ⊆ Be,
and that f(Be) ⊆ Be. To see this, let x ∈ Be. If f(e) = e, then f(x) ∈ Be. Suppose
that f(e) 6= e, then there is n ∈ N such that fn(x) = e. But f(x) 6= e implies n ≥ 2, so
fn−1(f(x)) = e, and f(x) ∈ Be. The proof that f(Be) ⊆ Be is similar.
Now I can obtain ≤e and ≤e from Theorem 2. First, f |Be , the restriction of f to Be,
maps Be into Be, has exactly one fixed point, and no cycles. By Theorem 2, there is a
total order—say ≤e—on Be such that f |Be is monotone increasing and e is the largest
element of Be. Second, by a similar argument, there is a total order ≤e on Be such that
f |Be is monotone increasing and e is the smallest element of Be—simply reverse the order
that Theorem 2 delivers on Be.
Let x = inf≤e Be and x = sup≤e Be.
Definition 12 Define the order ≤ on X by: z ≤ z ′ if and only if one (or more) of the
following is true :
1. z = z′,
2. z, z′ ∈ Be and z ≤e z′ or z, z′ ∈ Be and z ≤e z′,
3. z ∈ Be and z′ ∈ C,
4. z′ ∈ Be and z /∈ Be,
5. z ∈ Be, z′ ∈ A, and ge(z) ≥ g(z′).
Remark.
1. Note that ≤ coincides with ≤e on Be and with ≤e on Be.
2. Since ≤ coincides with ≤e on Be, ge is monotone decreasing: z < z′ implies ge(z) ≥
ge(z
′). Further, by construction of ≤e, ge(z) > ge(z
′) implies that z < z′.
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3. If z ∈ Be and z < e, then ge(f(z)) = ge(z)− 1.
4. For all z ∈ X, x ≤ z, so x is the smallest element in X.
I now prove that (X,≤) is a complete lattice (steps 1 and 2), that f is monotone
increasing (step 3), and that any other lattice order that makes f monotone increasing
must have a larger interval prediction (step 4).
Step 1: I prove that ≤ is a partial order. By definition of ≤ (item 1), ≤ is reflexive. I
need to prove that it is antisymmetric and transitive.
To prove that ≤ is antisymmetric, let z ≤ z ′ and z 6= z′, I shall prove that z′  z.
First, z ≤ z′ cannot be due to item 1 of the definition of ≤. Second, if z ≤ z ′ because of
item 2, then z′  z, as ≤e and ≤e are antisymmetric. Third, if z ∈ Be then z′ ≤ z only
if z′ ∈ Be as well. So, if z ≤ z′ by item 3 or item 5 we get immediately z ′  z. Fourth,
if z′ ∈ Be then z′ ≤ z only if z ∈ Be as well. So, if z ≤ z′ by item 4 we get immediately
z′  z.
Now I shall prove that ≤ is transitive: let z ≤ z ′ and z′ ≤ z′′, I shall prove that
z ≤ z′′. If either z ≤ z′ or z′ ≤ z′′ is due to item 1, it is immediate that z ≤ z ′′. So,
suppose that z 6= z′ and z′ 6= z′′.
First, let z ≤ z′ be due to item 2. If z, z′ ∈ Be then it must be that z′′ ∈ Be, but then
z ≤ z′′, as ≤e is transitive. Now let z, z
′ ∈ Be. Assume z′′ ∈ Be ∪ Be. Either z′′ ∈ Be
so z ≤ z′′ by item 4 or z′′ ∈ Be and z ≤ z′′ because ≤e is transitive. Now assume that
z′′ /∈ Be ∪ Be. Either z′′ ∈ C and we get z ≤ z′′ by item 3; or z′′ ∈ A, but then z′ ≤ z′′ is
due to item 5, so z ≤e z
′ implies that ge(z) ≥ ge(z
′) ≥ g(z′′). Thus z ≤ z′′ by item 5.
Second, let z ≤ z′ be due to item 3; z′ ≤ z′′ can then only be due to item 4. So
z′′ ∈ Be, and we have z ≤ z′′ by item 4.
Third, if z ≤ z′ is due to item 4, then z′ ∈ Be, so z′ ≤ z′′ implies that z′′ ∈ Be, and
we have z ≤ z′′ by item 4.
Fourth, if z ≤ z′ is due to item 5, then z′ ∈ A. But then z′ ≤ z′′ implies that z′′ ∈ Be,
so we get z ≤ z′′ by item 4.
Step 2: I prove that (X,≤) is a lattice. Since X is finite, (X,≤) is then a complete
lattice.
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Let z, z′ ∈ X. If z ≤ z′ or z′ ≤ z, then z ∨ z′ and z ∧ z′ are trivial. So let z and z′ be
unordered, and note that, when z and z ′ are unordered, z ∨ z′ is the smallest element of
{z˜ ∈ X : z < z˜}∩{z˜ ∈ X : z ′ < z˜}, and z∧ z′ is the largest element of {z˜ ∈ X : z˜ < z}∩
{z˜ ∈ X : z˜ < z′}.
I shall need the following two facts, the facts are immediate from the definition of ≤.
Fact 1: If z ∈ (C ∪ A) \ {e}, then x ∈ {z˜ ∈ X : z˜ < z} ⊆ Be.
Fact 2: If z ∈ (C ∪ A) \ {e}, then {z˜ ∈ X : z < z˜} = Be.
First, let z ∈ Be. Since z and z′ are unordered, we must have z′ ∈ A. Also, z 6= x, as
x is the smallest element in X, so z = x would imply that z and z ′ are ordered. Note that
z ∈ Be\ {x} implies that x ∈ {z˜ ∈ X : z˜ < z} ⊆ Be, and {z˜ ∈ X : z < z˜} = Be. Hence,
by facts 1 and 2,
x ∈ {z˜ ∈ X : z˜ < z} ∩ {z˜ ∈ X : z˜ < z ′} ⊆ Be,
and
{z˜ ∈ X : z < z˜} ∩ {z˜ ∈ X : z ′ < z˜} = Be.
But ≤ is a total order on Be, and Be is finite, so any non-empty subset of Be has a largest
element. Thus z ∧ z′ exists. Similarly, Be is finite and totally ordered by ≤. So Be has a
smallest element (namely e), and z ∨ z ′ exists.
Second, let z ∈ A. Since z and z′ are unordered we must have z′ /∈ Be. Further, if
z′ ∈ Be then we already proved above that z ∧ z ′ and z ∨ z′ exist. Let z′ ∈ (C ∪ A) \ {e}.
Using facts 1 and 2 in as above, we know that {z˜ ∈ X : z˜ < z} ∩ {z˜ ∈ X : z˜ < z ′} is a
non-empty subset of Be, and that {z˜ ∈ X : z < z˜}∩{z˜ ∈ X : z ′ < z˜} = Be. Since Be and
Be are finite, totally ordered sets, z ∧ z ′ and z ∨ z′ exist in X.
Third, let z ∈ C\ {e, e}. Since z and z ′ are unordered, we must have z′ ∈ (C ∪ A) \ {e, e}.
If z′ ∈ A, then we know that z∧z′ and z∨z′ exist in X from the argument in the previous
paragraph. If, z′ ∈ C, then
x ∈ {z˜ ∈ X : z˜ < z} = {z˜ ∈ X : z˜ < z ′} = Be
and
{z˜ ∈ X : z < z˜} = {z˜ ∈ X : z′ < z˜} = Be.
Again Be and Be are finite and totally ordered by ≤, so z ∧ z ′ and z ∨ z′ exist in X.
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Finally, if z ∈ Be, z and z′ cannot be unordered, as z′ /∈ Be implies z′ ≤ z, and z′ ∈ Be
implies that z and z′ are ordered, as Be is totally ordered.
Step 3: Now I prove that f is monotone increasing.
Let z ≤ z′. I need to prove that f(z) ≤ f(z ′). First, if z ≤ z′ is due to item 1,
then f(z) ≤ f(z′) because f(z) = f(z′). And if z ≤ z′ is due to item 2 it is immediate
that f(z) ≤ f(z′) because ≤ concides with ≤e and ≤e on Be and Be, and ≤e and ≤e are
constructed so that f is monotone increasing.
Second, let z ≤ z′ be due to item 3. z ∈ Be implies that f(z) ∈ Be, and z′ ∈ C implies
that f(z′) ∈ C. So, we get f(z) ≤ f(z ′) by item 3.
Third, let z ≤ z′ be due to item 4. z′ ∈ Be implies that f(z′) ∈ Be. Also, z /∈ Be
implies f(z) /∈ Be, as, for any z˜ ∈ X, f(z˜) ∈ Be implies z˜ ∈ Be by the definition of Be.
Hence f(z) ≤ f(z′) due to item 4.
Fourth, let z ≤ z′ be due to item 5. So, z ∈ Be and z′ ∈ A. If f(z′) ∈ C, then
f(z) ≤ f(z′) by item 3, as f(z) ∈ Be. Assume f(z′) /∈ C. Since z ≤ z′, ge(z) ≥ g(z′).
Now, Π is finite, so there is a path pˆi such that g(z ′) = He−
[
Hpˆi − hpˆi(z′)
]
. Since f(z′) /∈ C,
we must have f(z′) ∈ pˆi, and hpˆi(f(z
′)) = hpˆi(z
′)− 1. So,
g(f(z′)) ≤ He − [Hpˆi − hpˆi(f(z
′))]
= He − [Hpˆi − hpˆi(z
′)]− 1
= g(z′)− 1.
On the other hand, z ∈ Be, so either z = e or z < e. First, if z = e, then f(z) = e, so
ge(z) = ge(f(z)). Then ge(z) ≥ g(z
′) and g(f(z′)) ≤ g(z′) − 1 implies that ge(f(z)) ≥
g(f(z′)), so f(z) ≤ f(z′) by item 5.
Second, if z < e, then ge(f(z)) = ge(z)− 1. So, ge(z) ≥ g(z
′) implies that ge(f(z)) =
ge(z)− 1 ≥ g(z
′)− 1 ≥ g(f(z′)). Thus f(z) ≤ f(z′) by item 5.
Step 4: Let  be a partial order on X, such that (X,) is a complete lattice, f is
monotone increasing, e is the smallest fixed point of f , and e is the largest fixed point of
f . Let z ∈ X be such that e ≤ z ≤ e. I prove that e  z  e.
Let x∗ = inf X. By Theorem 4.3.4 in Topkis (1998), there is a k ∈ N such that
e = fk(x∗). Let K be the smallest such k, and note that e = f k(x∗) for all k ≥ K, as e
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is a fixed point of f . Note also that the existence of K implies that x∗ ∈ Be, and note
that He ≥ K.
Now, by the definition of ≤, e ≤ z ≤ e implies that either z ∈ C or z ∈ A. Suppose,
first, that z ∈ C. Let n ∈ N be such that z = fn(z), at least one such n exists because
z ∈ C. Let M ∈ N be such that K ≤ nM , note that fnM(z) = z. Now, x∗  z, because
x∗ = inf X. So, f monotone increasing implies that f
nM(x∗)  fnM(z). But K ≤ nM
implies that fnM(x∗) = e, so we have that e  z. Repeat the argument with sup X in
the place of x∗ and we get z  e.
Suppose now that z ∈ A. Then e ≤ z implies that ge(e) ≥ g(z). But ge(e) = 0, so
0 ≥ g(z). There is pˆi ∈ Π such that z ∈ pˆi and g(z) = He − [Hpˆi − hpˆi(z)].Thus we have
Hpˆi − hpˆi(z) ≥ He ≥ K.
Let z′ = zHpˆi . Then z
′ ∈ pi, and
fHpˆi−hpˆi(z)(z′) = z.
Since x∗ = inf X, we have x
∗  z′, so f monotone increasing and
Hpˆi − hpˆi(z) ≥ K implies that
e = fHpˆi−hpˆi(z)(x∗)  fHpˆi−hpˆi(z)(z′) = z.
This proves that e  z. Now for e: Recall that He ≥ He, so Hpˆi − hpˆi(z) ≥ He. By
definition of He, then,
fHpˆi−hpˆi(z)(sup

X) = e.
But z′  sup X so
z = fHpˆi−hpˆi(z)(z′)  fHpˆi−hpˆi(z)(sup

X) = e.
This proves that e  z  e. 
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